Archive for April, 2009
Today, the AJC published an Op-Ed by yours truly on the potential economic development benefits of the new Gwinnett Stadium. Here is a snippet.
Braves 1, taxpayers 0
Economic benefits overstated for publicly funded Gwinnett stadium
By J.C. Bradbury
For the Journal-Constitution
Saturday, April 25, 2009
On April 17, the Gwinnett Braves began play at their new home in Gwinnett County. The publicly funded stadium was initially slated to cost $45 million, but the price quickly ballooned to $64 million, with no word yet on what the final construction tab will be. In addition, the county has been unable to sell naming rights to the stadium, which the county anticipated returning $500,000 annually to cover 20 percent of the debt service.
Despite recent county government budget cuts, layoffs and tax hikes, the commissioners have insisted that the stadium will increase economic activity more than enough to offset construction costs. However, economists have long known that the frequently touted economic benefits of sports facilities are pure fantasy.
For further details see this post.
How to run an effective PR campaign. Step 1: get the incentives right.
Sometimes, of course, the arguments are such that the specialists can develop and summarize them to the point that an intelligent layman can evaluate them. But often—and I feel pretty sure here—that’s just not the case. Give me a topic I know fairly intimately, and I can often make a convincing case for absolute horseshit. Convincing, at any rate, to an ordinary educated person with only passing acquaintance with the topic. A specialist would surely see through it, but in an argument between us, the lay observer wouldn’t necessarily be able to tell which of us really had the better case on the basis of the arguments alone—at least not without putting in the time to become something of a specialist himself. Actually, I have a plausible advantage here as a peddler of horseshit: I need only worry about what sounds plausible. If my opponent is trying to explain what’s true, he may be constrained to introduce concepts that take a while to explain and are hard to follow, trying the patience (and perhaps wounding the ego) of the audience.
Come to think of it, there’s a certain class of rhetoric I’m going to call the “one way hash” argument. Most modern cryptographic systems in wide use are based on a certain mathematical asymmetry: You can multiply a couple of large prime numbers much (much, much, much, much) more quickly than you can factor the product back into primes. Certain bad arguments work the same way—skim online debates between biologists and earnest ID afficionados armed with talking points if you want a few examples: The talking point on one side is just complex enough that it’s both intelligible—even somewhat intuitive—to the layman and sounds as though it might qualify as some kind of insight. (If it seems too obvious, perhaps paradoxically, we’ll tend to assume everyone on the other side thought of it themselves and had some good reason to reject it.) The rebuttal, by contrast, may require explaining a whole series of preliminary concepts before it’s really possible to explain why the talking point is wrong. So the setup is “snappy, intuitively appealing argument without obvious problems” vs. “rebuttal I probably don’t have time to read, let alone analyze closely.”
If we don’t sometimes defer to the expert consensus, we’ll systematically tend to go wrong in the face of one-way-hash arguments, at least our own necessarily limited domains of knowledge. Indeed, in such cases, trying to evaluate the arguments on their merits will tend to lead to an erroneous conclusion more often than simply trying to gauge the credibility of the various disputants. The problem, of course, is gauging your own competence level well enough to know when to assess arguments and when to assess arguers. Thanks to the perverse phenomenon psychologists have dubbed the Dunning-Kruger effect, those who are least competent tend to have the most wildly inflated estimates of their own knowledge and competence. They don’t know enough to know that they don’t know, as it were.
I’ve encountered the Dunning-Kruger effect from both sides. I have observed/experienced that hubris is a great barrier to learning (I am so thankful to a few Wofford professors who cut me down to size), but I did not realize that someone had studied it. Here’s my version.
Thanks to Dave Berri for the pointer.